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Civil marriage is at once a deeply personal commitment to another
human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality,
companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family. "It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not in political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." Because it
fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our
common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution and the
decision whether and whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of
self-definition.'
I. INTRODUCTION
At 11:06 a.m. on February 12, 2004, Phyllis Lyon, seventy-nine, and Del
Martin, eighty-three, exchanged wedding vows, kissed, and then embraced when
San Francisco assessor-recorder Mabel Teng pronounced the two "spouse[s] for
life.",2 The women had been in a committed relationship for fifty-one years, but
had never previously considered the possibility of getting married.3
Unfortunately, their honeymoon was short-lived, as the California Supreme
Court ruled exactly six months later that their marriage was illegal and thus
invalid.4
In recent years, the question of whether all persons are entitled to the
fundamental right to marry,5 regardless of sexual orientation, has emerged as an
important issue dividing the American population.6 Few topics of legal policy in
this century have generated so much attention or so cleanly divided the nation
On one side, advocates of civil rights adamantly argue that equal protection of
the laws should be provided to all citizens, rather than only to heterosexual
citizens." On the other side, religious conservatives are equally convinced that
1. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954-55 (Mass. 2003) (quoting Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965)).
2. Rachel Gordon, S.F. Defies Laws, Marries Gays: Legal Battle Looms: City Hall Ceremonies Spur
Constitutional Showdown, Injunction Threat, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13, 2004, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
5. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of
man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942))); Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (holding that the fundamental right to marry includes a
person's right to marry the person of his or her choosing).
6. See generally Maura Dolan & Lee Romney, S.F. Wedding Planners Are Pursuing a Legal Strategy,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2004, at Al (outlining the battles fought by civil rights attorneys in recent years); Suzanne
Herel, Court Halts Gay Vows: 29-Day Drama: S.F. Unleashed a "Gay-Marriage Tsunami," S.F. CHRON., Mar.
12, 2004, at Al (describing the question of whether there is right to marry the person of one's choosing as "a
national debate that [has] been simmering for decades").
7. Kevin J. Worthen, Who Decides and What Difference Does it Make?: Defining Marriage in "Our
Democratic, Federal Republic," 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 273, 273 (2003) ("Literally hundreds of law review articles
have been written on the topic.").
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
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gay men and lesbians have no right to marry and that the current laws limiting
marriage to a legal union between one man and one woman must be strengthened
to ensure that same-sex couples are never allowed to receive any of the benefits
of marriage.9
In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts delivered a landmark
opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health' and held that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Massachusetts Constitution decrees that all persons must
be allowed to marry, regardless of sexual preference." Several states reacted to
the opinion by rushing to pass state constitutional amendments limiting marriage
to a union between a man and a woman.12 As of November 7, 2006, voters in
twenty-six states passed constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex couples
from marrying. 3 Voters rejected such an amendment in only one state.'4 On the
other hand, only three states other than Massachusetts have granted full marital
rights to same-sex couples; to date, none of them will use the term "marriage" to
refer to these institutions.'5 California citizens have not voted on a constitutional
amendment, making the issue controversial as both sides of the debate fervently
attempt to change the law.
6
This Comment looks at the California political process in an effort to
determine which source of political power has the ability to grant or withhold
equal protection of the laws.").
9. See, e.g., ProtectMarriage.com, About Us, http://www.protectmarriage.com/index.aspx?protect
=aboutus (last visited Nov. 20, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("ProtectMarriage.com is a
growing, broad-based coalition of organizations, churches, and individuals who believe that marriage's
foremost purpose is the raising of healthy children in a family with a mom and a dad.").
10. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
11. Id. at 950 n.7 ("All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential, and
unalienable rights .... Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged .... (quoting MASS. CONST. art.
I)). Following Goodridge, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an injunction in federal court. Largess v. Supreme
Judicial Court, 317 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd by 373 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.
1002 (2004). The court denied relief. Id..
12. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 ("Only a union between one man and one woman may be a
marriage valid in or recognized by this state."); Id. art. 1I, § 35 (limiting marriage to one man and one woman
and refusing to recognize marriages performed in other states that unite two individuals of the same sex); TEx.
CONST. art. I, § 32 ("Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. This
state... may not create or recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage.").
13. Wyatt Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: 7 States OK Ban-But it Trails in Arizona, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 8, 2006, at A-10.
14. Id.
15. See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding that the New Jersey Constitution requires
same-sex couples be treated the same as heterosexual couples under the law, but leaving it up to the Legislature
to decide whether to refer to these unions as "marriages" or by some other name); see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46b-38aa to 46b-38pp (West 2005) (providing that same-sex couples in Connecticut may enter into
civil unions and shall be considered the equivalent of married spouses in all aspects of the law); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (1999) (explaining that same-sex couples are entitled to form civil unions, which are legal
relationships that are equivalent to marriage).
16. See generally Buchanan, supra note 13, at A-10 (outlining recent efforts on both sides of the
controversy).
2007/Equal Protection Versus the Will of the Voters
marital rights-the people, the Legislature, or the judiciary.'7 Part II reviews the
history of marriage rights in California. Part III looks at the California initiative
process, including recent attempts to change marriage law. Part IV reviews the
separation of powers in California and looks at the rights and responsibilities of
the people and the judicial and legislative branches. This Comment ultimately
concludes that, because a court has the ability to weigh constitutional principles
against the asserted will of the people, the California Supreme Court is in the best
position to decide whether marital rights and benefits should be extended to all
citizens.
II. MARRIAGE IN CALIFORNIA
A. Background Information
In 1948, California became the first state in the Union to overturn laws
forbidding interracial marriage by finding that each California citizen has a
fundamental right to marry the individual of his or her choosing.' 8 Nearly thirty
years later, the Legislature rewrote California Family Code section 300 to change
the definition of marriage to a union between a man and a woman, fearing that
the prior, gender-neutral definition could have allowed same-sex couples to
19
marry.
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA). The Act provided that the federal government would recognize only
17. The issue is not whether there is a fundamental right to "same-sex marriage." There is not a question
of whether gay men and lesbians should be allowed to form a separate subset of marriage; the issue is whether
the fundamental fight to marry should be extended to all citizens. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675,
731 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2006) (Klime, J., dissenting).
[T]he conclusion that my colleagues reach is preordained by a false premise. Respondents are no
more asserting a 'fight to same-sex marriage' than the plaintiffs in Perez v. Sharp and Loving v.
Virginia were asserting a right to interracial marriage; or the plaintiff in Bowers was asserting a
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Respondents do not seek the establishment
of a 'new' constitutional right to serve their special interests, but rather the application of an
established right to marry a person of one's choice; a right available to all that government cannot
significantly restrict in the absence of compelling need. As in Bowers, the majority's
mischaracterization of the fight asserted in this case 'discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate
the extent of the liberty at stake.'
Id. (citations omitted). See generally Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 1028 (Wash. 2006) (5-4 decision)
(Bridge, J., concurring in J. Fairhurst's dissent) ("[Asking] whether there is a fundamental fight to 'same-sex
marriage' ... frame[s] the issue before us so as to ignore not only petitioners' fundamental right to privacy but
also the legislature's blatant animosity toward gays and lesbians."); Lewis, 908 A.2d at 224-25 (Poritz, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[B]y asking whether there is a fight to same-sex marriage, [the
majority] avoids the more difficult questions of personal dignity and autonomy raised in this case.").
18. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
19. See generally In re Coordination Proceeding, Special Title Rule 1550(c), No. 4365, 2005 WL
583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005), rev'd sub. nom. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Ct. App.
1st Dist. 2006) (discussing the legislative history behind California Family Code section 300, which provides
the legal definition of marriage within the state).
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marriages between a man and a woman and allowed each state to determine
whether to legally recognize "a relationship between persons of the same sex that
is treated as a marriage" by another state.2° Four years later, California voters
passed Proposition 22 with sixty-one percent of the vote. 2' The proposition
amended the California Family Code to declare that only marriage between a
man and a woman would be recognized or valid in the state.22 In the last several
years, the Legislature passed a number of laws expanding the rights bestowed
upon registered domestic partnerships-legal unions that are similar to
marriages. 23 Today, the rights and responsibilities granted to registered domestic
partners are almost as inclusive as those associated with marriage.4
B. A Mayor Standing Up, the Court Shutting Him Down
On February 12, 2004, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom began issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, declaring that California's ban on same-
sex marriages unfairly discriminated against gay men and lesbians.2- The
California Supreme Court halted the ceremonies on March 11, 2004, pending a
determination of the legality of Mayor Newsom's actions.26 From the moment
that San Francisco began issuing gender-neutral marriage licenses until the time
the court halted the ceremonies, 3955 same-sex couples flooded the city to
legalize their unions.27 Six months later, the court invalidated all of these
marriages, holding that public officials have a duty to uphold the laws of the
state-even those laws with which they disagree. 28 The court refused to discuss
the constitutionality of California Family Code sections 300 and 308.5, stating
20. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 2006); 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 2005).
21. Lee Romney & Maura Dolan, Judge Rules State Can't Bar Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2005, at Al.
22. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004) (codifying California's Proposition 22).
23. See id. § 297 (defining a domestic partnership as "two adults who have chosen to share one another's
lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring"). Members of a domestic partnership must be
of the same gender, unless one or both persons are older than age sixty-two and other eligibility criteria are met.
Id.; see also id. § 297.5 (explaining the rights, responsibilities, obligations, and protections afforded to
registered domestic partners).
24. See, e.g., id. § 297.5(c) (providing that a surviving domestic partner has the same rights by law as a
widow or widower); id. § 297.5(d) (allowing domestic partners to have the same rights and obligations as
spouses with regard to a child by either of the partners). But see id. § 297.5(g) (stating specifically that
registered domestic partners are prohibited from filing a joint California state tax return).
25. Gordon, supra note 2, at Al.
26. Bob Egelko, Surprise Ruling: Newsom Says the City Will Make a Strong Case, S.F. CHRON., Mar.
12, 2004, at Al.
27. Bob Egelko, A Mayor Overruled: Newsom Found to Violate California Law by Issuing Same-Sex
Licenses, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 2004, at Al.
28. Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004). The court also ordered
the city to refund, upon request, the eighty-two-dollar license fee and the sixty-two-dollar wedding ceremony
fee paid by each couple. Id. at 499; see also Egelko, supra note 27, at Al (pointing out that, if each couple
actually sought reimbursement, the city would be required to pay nearly $570,000).
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only that a ministerial official cannot avoid complying with a law on the grounds
that "in his opinion the law is unconstitutional. 29
The City of San Francisco then filed suit against the State of California,
arguing that the state's law prohibiting gay men and lesbians from enjoying the
right to marry violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the California
Constitution30 and the United States Constitution." Reviewing the California
Family Code,32 San Francisco District Court Judge Richard Kramer held that
California's laws limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman are
unconstitutional.33
When a statute implicates an individual's fundamental human rights or
singles out a suspect class for different treatment, courts subject the law to strict
scrutiny.34 Judge Kramer found that the strict scrutiny standard is appropriate in
the context of limitations on the fight to marry; however, he went on to state that
the marriage statutes would also be invalid under the more deferential rational
basis test. 5
Specifically, Judge Kramer determined that California's laws prohibiting two
consenting individuals of the same gender from entering into a legal marriage are
not rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and therefore unlawfully
discriminate against lesbians and gays.36 The fact that California has granted a
number of marriage-like rights to same-sex couples supports the idea that there is
no rational basis for denying them the fight to marry. In fact, having different
laws for married couples and registered domestic partners "smacks of a concept
long rejected by the courts: separate but equal.""
The state claimed that the traditional definition of marriage is rooted in our
nation's history, an argument that Judge Kramer summarily dismissed.3" The fact
that society has traditionally done something in a certain way is not a rational
basis for upholding a law that is otherwise discriminatory:3 9 "Certainly the fact
29. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 494 (quoting State v. State Bd. of Equalizers, 94 So. 681, 684 (Fla. 1922)
(emphasis omitted)).
30. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
32. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2004) (defining marriage as a civil contract between a man and a
woman); id. § 308.5 ("Only marriage between a man and a woman will be valid or recognized in California.").
33. In re Coordination Proceeding, Special Title Rule 1550(c), No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Mar. 14, 2005), rev'd sub nom. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2006) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
34. Id. at *2.
35. See id. (explaining that under the rational basis test a law is "presumptively valid and must be upheld
so long as there exists a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose"). While there is some dispute regarding the proper standard of review in cases that
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, this Comment discusses only the applicability of the rational
basis test.
36. Id. at *3.
37. Id. at *5 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1952)).
38. Id. at *3.
39. Id.
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alone that the discrimination has been sanctioned by the state for many years
does not supply [constitutional] justification. 4 0 For example, although both
tradition and history support the notion that interracial marriage should be illegal,
such a law today would clearly be unconstitutional.' Judge Kramer concluded
that California could not constitutionally deprive same-sex couples of the right to
42marry.
Writing three separate opinions that spanned 128 pages, a three-judge panel
from the First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court ruling.43 Refraining
the issue to support their conclusion, the First District held that there is no right
to "same-sex marriage."" The Court then went a step further, holding that
California's current marriage laws do not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation because "the Family Code provisions we are considering make no
reference to the sexual orientation of potential marriage partners. California law
does not literally prohibit gays and lesbians from marrying; however, it requires
those who do to marry someone of the opposite sex.,,4' The court acknowledged
that this requirement "excludes 100 percent of [lesbian and gay couples] from
entering marriage '" 6 and that the legislative history shows a specific intent to
exclude these couples,47 yet it failed to explain how this exclusion is not
discriminatory.4 ' As Justice Klime stated in his dissent:
The question at the center of this case is whether the reasons the United
'States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have deemed
marriage a fundamental constitutional right are as applicable to same-sex
couples as to couples consisting of members of the opposite sex. The
majority's indifference to those reasons effectively divests the marital
relationship of its most constitutionally significant qualities and permits
marriage to be defined instead by who it excludes. Though not its
purpose, the inescapable effect of the analysis the majority adopts is to
'40. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 27 (Cal. 1948) (overturning California's ban on interracial
marriage because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution).
41. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack.").
42. In re Coordination Proceeding, 2005 WL 583129.
43. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Ct. App. 1 st Dist. 2006).
44. The majority ignored the fact that no one asserts a right to "same-sex marriage." See supra note 17.
45. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 709.
46 Id. at 709 n.23.
47. Id. at 709- 10.
48. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (7th ed. 1999) (Defining discrimination as "[dlifferential
treatment; esp. a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those
favored and those not favored") (emphasis added).
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diminish the humanity of lesbians and gay men whose rights are de-
feated.49
The California Supreme Court has agreed to review the case, ° leaving these
questions unresolved. Throughout this long process, most of the parties involved
expressed a belief that the court would be required to resolve the issue.5
C. Removing Gender from Marriage
On September 6, 2005, California's Legislature became the first legislative
body in the nation to rewrite the definition of marriage in gender-neutral terms
without prompting by the judiciary 2 After a bill failed in the Assembly by four
votes, Assembly Member Mark Leno amended the bill into Assembly Bill 849
("AB 849"), which was already pending in the more liberal Senate.53 The Senate
approved the bill by a vote of twenty-one to fifteen and sent it back to the
Assembly where it managed to secure forty-one "ayes"; only thirty-five
representatives voted against the bill.54 AB 849 would have rewritten the
California Family Code to define marriage as a contract based upon the
relationship between two persons legally capable of giving consent, thereby
removing any gender-based requirements.55 Eliminating the phrase "between a
man and a woman' 56 from the definition of marriage would have allowed all
couples to marry."
49. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 731 (Klime, J., dissenting).
50. See California Courts-Appellate Court Case Information, http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/
(search by Supreme Court, then search by case number S147999) (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (showing that the Supreme Court granted petition for review on December 20, 2006).
51. Romney & Dolan, supra note 21, at Al.
52. See Bill Ainsworth, Assembly OKs Same-Sex Marriage: First-in-Nation Measure Now Goes to
Schwarzenegger, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 7, 2005, at A-I (noting that the Massachusetts Legislature
amended the state's marriage laws only after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a decree that
ordered it to do so); see also A.B. 849, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) ("Marriage is a personal relation
arising out of a civil contract between two persons ....").
53. Ainsworth, supra note 52, at Al; see also ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 849, at
2 (as introduced Feb. 18, 2005) (explaining that, when the Assembly originally passed the bill, it dealt with fish
and game). The Senate deleted the original bill in its entirety and inserted the provisions relating to civil
marriage. Id. at 1.
54. Ainsworth, supra note 52, at Al.
55. Id.
56. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2004).
57. See A.B. 849, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) ("The Legislature has an interest in
encouraging stable relationships regardless of the gender or sexual orientation of the partners. The benefits that
accrue to the general community when couples undertake the mutual obligations of marriage accrue regardless
of the gender or sexual orientation of the partners . .. . It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to
end the pernicious practice of marriage discrimination in California.").
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A month later, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill, claiming that the
legislation was an illegal attempt to overrule Proposition 22.58 In a message
accompanying the veto, he wrote that "he believed gay couples were 'entitled to
full protection under the law and should not be discriminated against. ' The
Governor maintained that the definition of marriage was best left up to the people
or the judiciary, rather than the Legislature. 6° Following the veto, opponents of
equal rights for gays and lesbians vowed to renew their efforts to amend the State
Constitution.6'
III. CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES
A. The Effect of Proposition 22 on California Law
In 2000, voters passed Proposition 22, which succinctly stated: "Only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.
62
California Family Code codifies Proposition 22 in the section that discusses
marriages performed outside of California.63 Taken at face value, the law states
that all marriages performed outside of California are given the same legal effect
as marriages performed within the state, with the exception that legal marriages
between same-sex couples performed outside of the state are invalid.64 The law
does not say that same-sex couples are unable to marry within California.65
Assembly Member Mark Leno argues that a new law eliminating the gender
requirements from the definition of marriage would not overrule Proposition 22,
but would change only the 1978 Legislative Act defining marriage as a union
66between a man and a woman. Advocates of traditional marriage counter with
the contention that the California Family Code applies to all marriages,
regardless of where the parties solemnized their VOWS.67 Not surprisingly, courts
have reached different opinions as to whether the law would also prevent same-
68sex couples from legally marrying within the state.
58. Nancy Vogel & Jordan Rau, Gov. Vetoes Same-Sex Marriage Bill, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at B3.
59. Id.
60. Bill Ainsworth, Governor Will Reject Gay Marriage Legislation, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 8,
2005, at A-1; cf. infra text accompanying note 127.
61. Ainsworth, Governor Will Reject Gay Marriage Legislation, supra note 60.
62. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004).
63. See id. § 308 ("A marriage contracted outside this state that would be valid by the laws of the
jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is valid in this state.").
64. Id. §§ 308-308.5.
65. Ainsworth, Governor Will Reject Gay Marriage Legislation, supra note 60. But see CAL. FAM.
CODE § 308 ("[T]he Legislature is thwarting the will of the voters.... Proposition 22 applies to all
marriages.").
66. Ainsworth, Governor Will Reject Gay Marriage Legislation, supra note 60.
67. Id.
68. Compare Armijo v. Miles, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623, 637 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2005) (determining that the
intent in passing Proposition 22 was to prevent California from recognizing marriages between same-sex
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While both arguments have merit, Proposition 22 as codified in the Family
Code references only marriages that were performed somewhere other than
California; the title of the section is "Foreign Marriages; validity. 69 Moreover,
the voters enacted Proposition 22 following the passage of DOMA, which allows
each state to refuse to recognize the validity of marriages performed in other
states when the marriage participants happen to be of the same gender.70 At the
time, supporters of Proposition 22 explained the measure as "a pre-emptive strike
in the event [that] other states legalize gay marriage."7 ' In fact, the Protection of
Marriage Committee, the official sponsor of Proposition 22, explained the
initiative by saying that "the primary focus of the measure is to bar California
from recognizing homosexual marriages performed in other states."72
The placement of the statute, the overall wording, and the intent of those who
originally supported the measure all strongly support Assembly Member Leno's
argument that Proposition 22 has no impact on the question of whether the right
to marry in California should be extended to lesbians and gay men.73 If this is the
case, the Legislature should be able to amend section 300 of the Family Code to
provide a gender-neutral definition of marriage.
B. Two Competing Constitutional Amendments
Fearing the courts may expand marriage to include all couples, two
competing groups continue to attempt to pass state constitutional amendments
specifically defining marriage as an exclusive institution between one man and
one woman. These groups identify themselves as ProtectMarriage.com and
74VoteYesMarriage.com. To succeed in amending the Constitution, each group
must obtain the signatures of nearly 600,000 California citizens.75 While the
Legislature may amend the Constitution only by a two-thirds majority," an
couples performed in other states), with Knight v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 694 (Ct. App. 3d Dist.
2004) ("California will not permit same-sex partners to validly marry within the state.").
69. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.
70. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 2006).
71. Kevin Valine, Marriage Initiative Stirs Controversy, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, Cal.), Jan. 16,
20006, at 8A (emphasis added).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Ainsworth, Governor Will Reject Gay Marriage Legislation, supra note 60. But see CAL. FAM.
CODE § 308 ("[T]he Legislature is thwarting the will of the voters.... Proposition 22 applies to all
marriages."). See also text accompanying note 65.
74. Randy Thomasson of VoteYesMarriage.com has criticized ProtectNarriage.com's competing
measure as weak and encouraged its supporters to abandon the amendment in favor of the one his group
supports. See Lee Romney, Same-Sex Marriage Foes Falter in '06 Ballot Efforts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, at
Al ("People want true blue marriage protection.").
75. Id.; see also CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b) (explaining that to submit a constitutional amendment to the
Secretary of State for placement on the ballot, proponents of the measure must obtain the signatures of eight
percent of the voters).
76. CAL. CONST. art. XVIm1, § 1.
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amendment approved by the people requires only a simple majority.77 If passed,
these amendments would take effect the following day.78 Should voters pass both
amendments simultaneously, only the initiative that receives the higher
percentage of the vote will become effective.79
1. The California Constitutional Marriage Amendment
ProtectMarriage.com ° endorses the California Constitutional Marriage
Amendment (CMA). The language of this proposed initiative is very concise,
stating: "A marriage between a man and a woman is the only legal union that
shall be valid or recognized in this state."8' Proponents of the amendment believe
that it is necessary to ensure that politicians and judges do not "[chip] away at
[Proposition] 22 and [ignore] the will of the voters. 82
Referring to marriage as the "only legal union" recognized by the State of
California has the effect of nullifying domestic partnership laws and preventing
the Legislature from legalizing same-sex civil unions. 3 Additionally, supporters
of the CMA indicate that it would prevent the Legislature from requiring private
employers to give the same legal rights to same-sex couples that it gives to
opposite-sex couples.84 In this manner, the CMA seeks to ensure not only that
same-sex couples are unable to marry, but also that they are unable to qualify for
any of the benefits of marriage."
77. Id. § 4; cf Richard B. Collins, New Directions in Direct Democracy: How Democratic Are Initiatives?,
72 U. COLO. L. REV. 983 (2001) (suggesting that it is too easy for the voters to amend their state constitutions
through the initiative process and advocating a system that would make the process more difficult).
78. CAL. CONST. art. XVIIn, § 4.
79. Id.
80. See ProtectMarriage.com, supra note 9 ("ProtectMarriage.com is a growing, broad-based coalition
of organizations, churches, and individuals who believe that marriage's foremost purpose is the raising of
healthy children in a family with a mom and a dad."); ProtectMarriage.com, Mission, http://www.Protect
marriage.com/index.aspx?protect=mission (last visited Nov. 20, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(declaring that ProtectMarriage.com's mission is "[p]rotecting the legal status, rights and benefits of marriage
between a man and a woman in the state of California").
81. ProtectMarriage.com, FAQs, http://www.protectmarriage.com/index.aspx?protect=FAQ (last visited
Nov. 20, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
82. Id.
83. Id. ("By recognizing marriage between a man and a woman as the only legal union in California, this
amendment would prevent any law from recognizing, or giving rights on the basis of, other personal
relationships that attempt to imitate marriage, such as homosexual domestic partnerships or civil unions.")
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. ("Since no [civil union or domestic partnership] would be legally recognized, it logically follows
that there would also be no basis [for private employers] to confer rights, benefits, or obligations on [same-sex
couples].").
85. Those who oppose the equality of same-sex couples also oppose the idea of domestic partnerships
because such unions grant many of the rights traditionally reserved for married couples to registered domestic
partners. See Knight v. Super. Ct., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 687, 689 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2005) (arguing that California's
domestic partnership laws are the Legislature's illegal attempt to amend Proposition 22), petition for review
denied, S133961, 2005 Cal. LEXIS 7127 (Cal. June 29, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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2. The Voters' Right to Protect Marriage Initiative
Alternatively, VoteYesMarriage.com supports a Constitutional Amendment
entitled "The California Marriage Amendment: The Voters' Right to Protect
Marriage Initiative" ("Voters' Rights Initiative"), which would unambiguously
ban all same-sex unions within the state.86 The proposed amendment is much
more expansive than the CMA, to the extent that opponents have criticized it as
"mean-spirited" and "ahead of the pack in its viciousness."87 The proposed
amendment seeks to add the following text to the State Constitution:
Only marriage between one man and one woman is valid or recognized
in California, whether contracted in this state or elsewhere. Neither the
Legislature nor any court, government institution, government agency,
initiative statute, local government, or government official shall abolish
the civil institution of marriage between one man and one woman, or
require private entities to offer or provide rights, incidents, or benefits of
marriage to unmarried individuals, or bestow statutory rights, incidents,
or employee benefits of marriage on unmarried individuals. Any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding, from within this state or another
jurisdiction, that violates this section is void and unenforceable.8"
The second sentence of the amendment would revoke a number of the
current rights granted to registered domestic partners and deprive same-sex
couples of rights that they currently enjoy under domestic partnership statutes s9
For example, state and local governments would not be permitted to extend
healthcare benefits to same-sex couples, but private organizations would be
allowed to choose individually whether to extend these benefits. 90 Specifically,
while domestic partners would still be allowed to register with the state, they
would not be entitled to any of the rights traditionally awarded to spouses."
The final clause of the Voters' Rights Initiative poses an additional dilemma.
The text says that any judicial ruling that attempts to circumvent the law after it
86. See VoteYesMarriage.com, http://www.voteyesmarriage.com/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2006) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the intent and purpose of the Voters' Right Initiative).
87. Brian Melley, Same-Sex Marriage Opponents File for Ban, VENTURA COUNTY STAR (Ventura,
Cal.), May 20, 2005, at 6.
88. VoteYesMarriage.com, Text and Legal Effect of the Voters' Right to Protect Marriage Initiative,
http://www.voteyesmarriage.com/wst-page7.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
89. Melley, supra note 87.
90. Id.; see also VoteYesMarriage.com, Text and Legal Effect of the Voters' Right to Protect Marriage
Initiative, supra note 88 ("Private organizations and businesses [would be] allowed to choose their own policies
on marriage benefits.").
91. VoteYesMarriage.com, Text and Legal Effect of the Voters' Right to Protect Marriage Initiative,
supra note 88. VoteYesMarriage.com does not explain what incentive couples would have to register given that
they would not receive any rights or benefits for doing so. Id.
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passes would be "void and unenforceable."92 The question here is whether voters
have the right or power to define the jurisdiction of the courts in this manner. The
plain meaning of this provision is that California will not recognize any ruling
from any other state or any federal jurisdiction that recognizes or gives validity to
a relationship that happens to be between two men or two women. This provision
93
raises some questions that the text of the amendment does not answer.
The Supreme Court of the United States established its right to review state
laws for federal constitutional violations more than a century ago, indicating that
any attempt by a state to pass a law or constitutional amendment limiting the
Supreme Court's power of review would be futile.94 Only Congress may limit the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction: 9 "Arguably, states are constitutionally precluded
from passing legislation to preclude same-sex couples from marrying. 96
Although the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the issue, the developing
jurisprudence suggests that an amendment forbidding gay men and lesbians from
marrying would be constitutionally vulnerable.97 By this proposition, any attempt
by the California people to amend the State Constitution would be fruitless,
"since the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution would make those
state constitutional provisions null and void, whether or not they remained on the
books."98
If the provision in the Voters' Rights Initiative limiting the judiciary's ability
to review the law is not unconstitutional on its face, the fact that the provision
exists will not save the law from attack. In 1912, Colorado voters similarly tried
to limit the power of the state and federal courts by passing a constitutional
amendment providing that only the Colorado Supreme Court could hold a state
law unconstitutional.99 Additionally, the amendment provided that, if the
Colorado Supreme Court invalidated a law as unconstitutional, the people could
92. See id. (mandating that any judicial proceeding violating the section, from any jurisdiction, is void
and unenforceable). But see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
93. The author attempted to contact VoteYesMarriage.com for clarification. Telephone calls to the
telephone number listed on the website resulted only in referrals back to the web site; inquiries sent via e-mail
went unanswered.
94. See generally Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that the Supreme
Court of the United States has the authority to review state court decisions for constitutional violations to ensure
consistency throughout the United States).
95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction... with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.").
96. Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriage Referenda and the Constitution: On Hunter, Romer, and
Electoral Process Guarantees, 64 ALB. L. REV. 949, 951 (2001) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967)).
97. Id. at 953-54 ("[R]eferenda that are designed to alter the political structure to make it more difficult
for a particular identifiable minority to secure benefits or avoid burdens may well offend constitutional
guarantees.").
98. ld. at 952.
99. Collins, supra note 77, at 992-93.
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vote again to review the court's decision. ' 0 The State Supreme Court found itself
"stretch[ing] the federal Constitution to put down the populist rebellion against
its authority."'' The California Supreme Court might well find itself in a similar
position. If the provision of the Voters' Rights Initiative that limits the ability of
the California courts to overrule the amendment is valid, gay men and lesbians
will be forced to take the fight for equality to the federal courts. Either way, the
passage of the Voters' Rights Initiative would not automatically end the battle.
IV. WHO HAS THE POWER TO DECIDE WHETHER THE RIGHT TO MARRY
SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO ALL CALIFORNIA CITIZENS?
If a constitutional amendment would not end the debate over marriage, then
who gets to make the ultimate decision? In an effort to avoid the tyranny of
government, the Founding Fathers based the federal government on a separation
of powers theory-the idea that by dividing power among three branches, "all
forms of tyranny that might occur if one entity controlled all governmental
power" could be avoided.0 2 When California ratified its State Constitution many
years later, the drafters included a similar system of checks and balances. The
executive, 1 3 judicial, °4 and legislative' 5 branches all have specific functions to
ensure that their powers remain separate. Additionally, the California Constitu-
tion reserves a number of rights for the people and explains the process by which
the people may amend the document or pass initiatives to amend state laws.
'0"
A. The People
"All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for
their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it
when the public good may require."'0 7 The people of California have the right to
amend the State Constitution through the initiative process. ' 8 When the people
100. Id. at 993; see also People v. W. Union Tel. Co., 198 P. 146 (Colo. 1921) (holding that a state
constitution cannot deprive federal courts of the right to review the law for federal constitutional violations);
People v. Max, 198 P. 150 (Colo. 1921) (determining that, because the amendment was unconstitutional insofar
as it applied to the federal courts, it must also be inapplicable with regard to the state). "It is inconceivable that
the people of Colorado... would have considered the advisability of taking from their own courts the power to
construe their own constitution had they realized that while the Constitution of the United States stands they
were impotent to deprive those same courts of the power to construe that charter." Id. at 152.
101. Collins, supra note 77, at 993.
102. Worthen, supra note 7, at 281.
103. CAL. CONST. art. V.
104. Id. art. VI.
105. Id. art. IV.
106. Id. art. II.
107. Id. art. fl, § 1.
108. Id. art. II, § 8(a).
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pass an initiative, the Legislature may amend or repeal the law only if the voters
approve the change via another statute."
While the California Constitution provides broad powers to its citizenry, the
voters are not free to do whatever they want: "The voters may no more violate
the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body may do so
by enacting legislation."" ° One commentator has suggested that the initiative
process should be amended to make it more difficult to amend state constitutions
than to simply pass statutes.'
When the voters of a state pass an initiative, the courts are intended to be the
sole body with authority to review it. However, once the voters pass a
constitutional amendment, "[s]tate courts have no state-law basis to address
constitutional issues other than their authority to interpret the initiative,"
' 13
thereby depriving the courts of their power of review. One commentator suggests
that each state adopt a procedure that allows the voters to amend the state
constitution by initiative, except for the bill of rights and the section outlining the
initiative process." 4 This procedure would preserve the power of the people to
amend state constitutions, but would allow state courts to retain the right to
review decisions affecting fundamental rights, thus "keeping more issues within
the state[s'] legal system[s]."" 5 In this manner, states may effectively balance the
will of the people against the dangers involved with allowing bare majorities to
grant or revoke fundamental civil rights."
6
Additionally, any constitutional amendment restricting marriage may not be
valid. Historically, when a state passes two or more laws concerning the same
subject, the "later and more specific provision" will preempt an "earlier and more
general statute." 7 This same principle applies to constitutional amendments.
Thus, when the people approve a specific constitutional amendment, the new law
will automatically trump any conflicting prior amendment." 8 However, at least
one scholar has suggested that this historical practice is not the most desirable
109. Id. art. II, § 10(c).
110. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981).
111. Collins, supra note 77, at 1001.
112. Id. at 999.
113. Id. at 1000.
114. See id. at 1000-01 (explaining that Mississippi currently utilizes this procedure for amending its
Constitution).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1002-03.
117. See generally R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Reserving the Right: Does a Constitutional Marriage
Amendment Necessarily Trump an Earlier and More General Equal Protection or Privacy Provision?, 36
SETON HALL L. REV. 125, 127 (2005) (comparing the historical approach, that a newer law automatically
trumps any pre-existing, conflicting statutes, with a more recent balancing test undertaken by some courts).
118. See generally id. at 126-28 (explaining that, generally, courts have automatically assumed that state
constitutional amendments limiting marriage to a man and a woman preempt the constitutions' earlier, general
privacy or equal protection provisions).
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approach when reviewing constitutional amendments. "9 Another approach to
determine a law's legitimacy is to "weigh the constitutional interests at stake in
any given case and interpret the earlier and more general constitutional principle
of equality or privacy as ultimately governing over the [fundamental right]
,,120question.
In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States departed from the historical
view that a later constitutional amendment would automatically preempt a prior,
more general provision in a case regarding the impact of the Commerce Clause
on state regulations of the importation of liquor in the aftermath of the Twenty-
First Amendment. 2' The Court found that "both [provisions] are parts of the
same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must be
considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests
at stake in any concrete case.' ' 22 In subsequent cases, the Court determined that
section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment could not protect state liquor laws
from challenges on equal protection and First Amendment grounds.' 23 Under the
balancing test used in these cases, a more recent voter-passed amendment may
not automatically preempt the earlier, general constitutional promises of equality
and privacy; any law attempting to revoke these guarantees would be void and
unenforceable. 24 Therefore, it is important for the courts to weigh a newer
amendment against the older provision to see which should control.'25 Under this
approach, a constitutional amendment passed by the voters may not
automatically end the dispute over marriage; it could merely put the issue before
the courts for the ultimate determination.
B. The Legislature
The California Constitution grants legislative power to the Senate and the
Assembly, however, "the people reserve to themselves the power of initiative and
referendum."'' 26 The California Constitution expressly forbids the Legislature
from overruling the will of the people by passing statutes that conflict with voter-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 129-30.
121. Id. at 132-33; Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
122. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 332.
123. Painter, supra note 117, at 141-44 (explaining that a liquor law that classified individuals on the
basis of gender could not withstand scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, even though the Twenty-First
Amendment arguably permitted such laws).
124. See, e.g., id. (reviewing decisions in which the Supreme Court determined that section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment could not prevail over the Commerce Clause found in Article II, even though the
later provision is more specific).
125. See id. at 144-45 (arguing that the Court's Twenty-first Amendment cases indicate that a court
should weigh the constitutional interests at stake when evaluating a marriage amendment that conflicts with a
general privacy or equal protection provision).
126. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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passed initiatives.'27 Governor Schwarzenegger cited this constitutional provision
in his refusal to sign AB 849,"' declaring that the Legislature's effort illegally
attempted to overrule Proposition 22.29 Additionally, an administrative agency
has no ability to decide that a voter-passed initiative is unconstitutional or refuse
to enforce it absent a ruling by an appellate court."3
Allowing the Legislature to pass a law defining marriage is one of the more
attractive methods of settling the dispute over marriage because the Legislature is
one of "the key features of our 'democratic, federal republican system."""' A
state statute "could not be criticized as anti-democratic because it would be
enacted by the duly elected representatives of the people."' 32 Additionally, a
legislative enactment is often more well-thought-out than a voter-passed
initiative, and the Legislature has the ability to include certain compromises into
a statute prior to its passage. 33 A state legislative enactment would also lack the
"alienation potential" inherent in a court decision and therefore would be "one of
the prime contenders for the best form for resolving the ... issue.' 34
"It is well settled in California that 'the legislature has full control of the
subject of marriage and may fix the conditions under which the marital status
may be created or terminated .... To date, the only California appellate court
to address the issue in this context of allowing same-sex couples to marry
reached the same conclusion. 36 However, when the Legislature exercised this
power, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the measure, stating that the
Legislature exceeded its authority under the California Constitution.'37 The First
District Court addressed this problem briefly, stating:
Lest there be any speculation that the Legislature is powerless to address
the issue, because Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed its one attempt to do
so . . . one should not oversimplify what the Governor's veto message
127. See id. art. II, § 10(c) (stating that the Legislature may overrule a voter-approved initiative by
statute only if the initiative contains a provision allowing amendment or repeal without voter approval).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
129. Vogel & Rau, supra note 58. For a discussion of whether the bill would have actually overruled
Proposition 22 see Part M.A.
130. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5(a).
131. Worthen, supra note 7, at 302.
132. Id.
133. See generally Strasser, supra note 96, at 951-54 (discussing how legislation defining marriage
might be able to avoid some of the constitutional deficiencies that could be offended by a voter-passed
constitutional amendment).
134. Worthen, supra note 7, at 302.
135. Lockyer v. City & County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 467 (Cal. 2004) (quoting McClure v.
Donovan, 205 P.2d 17, 24 (Cal. 1949)).
136. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 675, 685 (Ct. App. I st Dist. 2006) ("The six cases before us
ultimately distill to the question of who gets to define marriage in our democratic society. We believe that this
power rests in the people and their elected representatives, and courts may not appropriate themselves the
power to change the definition of such a basic social institution.") (emphasis added).
137. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
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actually said. In exercising his veto power, the Governor expressed
doubts about the Legislature's ability to amend Fam. Code, section 308.5
118without submitting the matter to voters ....
Thus, California appears to be caught in a game of "not it!"-with everyone
reassigning elsewhere the power to make the decision. The result is a stalemate,
with everyone except Governor Schwarzenegger deferring to the Legislature;
Governor Schwarzenegger chose instead to block it. However, it is important to
note that the California Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the issue. 3 9
C. The Judiciary
Most commentators believe that ultimately the California Supreme Court will
decide whether each person in California has an equal right to marry the partner
of his or her choosing. 4 0 The function of the judicial branch is to interpret the
laws and review them for possible constitutional violations.'' In carrying out this
function, courts have generally given a great deal of deference to the popular
vote, 42 however, nothing in the Constitution requires the courts to bow to the will
of the people.
"One's right to life, liberty, and property.., and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.'4 3
Additionally, "[a] citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply
because a majority of the people choose that [they] be."' 4 Allowing the
California Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of the state's marriage
laws appears to be the best way to ensure that the majority of the voters cannot
infringe upon the rights of the minority.
138. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 726 n.35. The opinion failed to address the fact that A.B.
849 made no mention of Family Code section 308.5. Id.
139. See supra text accompanying note 50. The California Supreme Court has, however, implicitly
stated that domestic partnerships are not the same as marriage, thus negating the state's arguments that the
institutions are equal. See Knight v. Schwarzenegger, 128 Cal. App. 4th 14 (2005) (holding domestic
partnership laws do not overrule section 308.5 because a domestic partnership is not marriage), petition for
review denied, 2005 CAL. LExis 7127 (Cal. June 29, 2005); see also CAL. CT. R. 29.3(b)(2) (2006) ("When the
Court of Appeal receives an order dismissing review, the decision of that court is final .....
140. Romney & Dolan, supra note 21.
141. See generally CAL. CONST. art. 1I, § 3.5(a) (stating that no administrative agency may "declare a
statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate
court has made a determination that such a statute is unconstitutional").
142. See, e.g., Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning (Bruning 11), 455 F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir. 2006)
("Rational-basis review is highly deferential to the legislature or, in this case, to the electorate .... "); Andersen
v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 983 (Wash. 2006) (5-4 decision) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he public consensus, as
evidenced by legislation adopted after robust debate, must be given great deference.").
143. Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning (Bruning 1), 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1003 (D. Neb. 2005),
rev'd on other grounds, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 638 (1943)).
144. Id. (quoting Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assemb. of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964)).
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One problem that arises out of allowing the judicial branch to make the final
decision regarding the right to marry is that unlike legislators, the citizens of
California do not directly elect the members of the judiciary.'15 There is some
concern that tensions would arise if the members of a state court took it upon
themselves to declare that all people must be allowed to marry because a judge is
not required to answer to any constituents. 146 A number of citizens might take
exception to a judicial decree that conflicts with their ideas about marriage.'
47
Some people fear that allowing state courts to review marriage "can too easily
lead to judicial resolution of the issue contrary to the will of the people and the
legislature."' 48 The argument continues that "[a]t least some state court judges
appear to be too eager to ... resolve the issue for themselves, without a careful
consideration of their proper role in the system.'4 9
The problem with these statements, however, is that the role of the judiciary
is not to uphold the will of the people at the expense of constitutional principles.
These arguments ignore the fact that the judiciary serves a supervisory function,
ensuring that the state is not able to pass laws that violate the principles outlined
in the State Constitution.5 0 The judiciary is not a rubber-stamp designed to
validate the opinion of the majority of the voters, although that seems to be what
some people advocate.''
If faced with the issue of whether same-sex couples have the right to marry,
the California Supreme Court would be bound by state and federal constitutional
principles and precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. It is very
difficult to predict how the California Supreme Court would decide the issue.
One fairly recent case,'52 if followed, suggests the judiciary might decide that
California may not single out gay men and lesbians for disparate treatment.1
53
145. See CAL. CONST. art VI (discussing the process of appointing members of the judicial branch).
146. Worthen, supra note 7, at 302.
147. Romney, supra note 74, at AI (quoting Randy Thomasson as saying, "Judges and politicians have
no right to flush marriage down the drain").
148. Worthen, supra note 7, at 306.
149. Id. at 302. But see infra Part IV.C.2.
150. See generally CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5(a) (stating that no administrative agency may "declare a
statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate
court has made a determination that such a statute is unconstitutional").
151. See, e.g., Worthen, supra note 7, at 306 (arguing that allowing the courts to determine the
constitutionality of the current marriage laws runs the "risk of tyranny of the judiciary"); ProtectNarriage.com,
Why It's Needed, http://www.protectmarriage.com/index.aspxprotect=why (last visited Dec. 3, 2006) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (claiming that a number of recent court decisions have been inconsistent with
Proposition 22 and have ignored the will of the people).
152. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
153. See infra Part VI.C.1.
563
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1. Overruling a Voter-Approved Constitutional Amendment
In Romer v. Evans,54 the Supreme Court held for the first time that a state may
not discriminate against a class of people based on their sexual orientation.'55 In 1992,
the people of Colorado passed a state constitutional amendment ("Amendment 2")
that repealed all city and county ordinances that "prohibit[ed] discrimination on the
basis of homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or
relationships." 5 6 After a lengthy legal battle, the Colorado Supreme Court enjoined
enforcement of the amendment and the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari. "'
In effect, the law permitted citizens of Colorado to discriminate against one
group of people as defined by the amendment.' Previously, the ordinances in
question prohibited discrimination against a number of specific groups."' Amend-
ment 2 served only to enjoin enforcement of these laws with respect to gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals.16 Additionally, Amendment 2 made it acceptable for govern-
ment employers and state colleges to discriminate in this manner.161
The result of Amendment 2 was to single out gay men, bisexuals, and lesbians as
a class, preventing them from taking advantage of the laws of Colorado because of
their homosexual status. 162 The majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court
stated that the purpose of equal protection is to require the government "to remain
available to all who seek its assistance."'163 The Court believed that Amendment 2's
broad language could give rise to an interpretation that no government body could
support any legal claim that may arise if the victim happened to be homosexual. This
reading of the law served to deprive homosexuals of rights that the rest of the
population enjoyed. 64 These types of laws are "born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected."'' 65 The Court recognized that, "[i]f the constitutional conception of
'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a
bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
government interest."'
' 66
154. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
155. See id. at 635 ("[Amendment 2] is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake,
something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.").
156. Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. H, § 30b) (internal quotations omitted).
157. Id. at 625-26.
158. Id. at 627.
159. Id. at 628-29.
160. Id. at 629-30.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 633.
164. Id. at 630 ("It is a fair, if not necessary inference from the broad language of the amendment that it
deprives gays and lesbians of the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in
governmental and private settings.").
165. Id. at 634.
166. Id. (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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2. Deference to Public Opinion
Even following Romer, the future of gay civil rights remains unclear. To
avoid the application of Romer, those who oppose equal rights to marriage claim
that laws limiting marriage to a man and a woman are not merely bom of animus
towards gay men and lesbians. 67 Undoubtedly, supporters of statutes forbidding
interracial marriage in the sixties made the same assertion, which was not
sufficient to hide the true motivation behind those laws.' 68 However, "[b]ecause
of the lack of guidance given by the Romer court in its opinion, it is difficult to
predict precisely what [effect] the Romer decision will have on the analysis of
legislation that impacts specific groups.' ' 69 Romer did not set forth clear
guidelines for deciding these types of issues; as a result, most of the lower courts
faced with similar issues have avoided following the holding by reading Romer
very narrowly or distinguishing the case before them from Romer. 70 At least one
commentator has claimed that Romer stands only for the narrow proposition that
a state cannot completely exclude homosexuals from the political process and
leave them no recourse other than amending the state constitution.'7'
Less than a year after Romer, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
validity of a city charter amendment virtually identical to Amendment 2. 72 Article XII
of the Cincinnati Charter Amendment ("Article XII") stated that a person may not be
considered a member of a protected class or a minority based on his or her sexual
orientation.' It further stated that homosexuals were not entitled to any preferential
treatment and that any conflicting regulation "shall be null and void and of no force or
effect."'' 74 The district court originally considered Article XII in 1995 and found that
"homosexuals did not constitute either a 'suspect class' or a 'quasi-suspect class'
because the conduct which defined them as homosexuals was constitutionally
proscribable."'75
167. Strasser, supra note 96, at 957.
168. See id. ("[T]hose supporting anti-miscegenation laws at issue in Loving might have claimed that
they did not want marriage to be sullied by allowing individuals of different races to marry or... they did not
want the meaning of marriage to be undermined by such unions. Just as such an explanation would not have
sufficed... with respect to interracial marriages, it should not suffice now."); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("[Tlhe racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to
maintain White Supremacy.").
169. Robert. F. Bodi, Note, Democracy at Work: The Sixth Circuit Upholds the Right of the People to
Choose Their Own Morality in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d
289 (6th Cir. 1997), 32 AKRON L. REV. 667, 696 (1999) (citations omitted).
170. See infra text accompanying notes 172-200.
171. Bodi, supra note 169, at 696.
172. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th. Cir. 1997).
173. Id. at291.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 293 (quoting Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,
266-67 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1995)).
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The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with the Sixth Circuit,
vacating the judgment and remanding the case for reconsideration in light of
Romer.176 On remand, the Sixth Circuit applied the "rational relationship" test
used in Romer to determine that Article XII, a municipal ordinance virtually
identical to Amendment 2, was valid. 7 The Sixth Circuit believed that "the two
cases involved substantially different enactments of entirely distinct scope and
impact, which conceptually and analytically distinguished the constitutional
posture of the two measures.
Although the laws were virtually identical, one commentator suggests that
the Cincinnati Charter Amendment was not unconstitutional because it prevented
gay men and lesbians from obtaining anti-discrimination support only at the city
level, without depriving them of protection statewide, as Amendment 2 did.
1 79
Whereas Amendment 2 left the affected class with no choice but to amend the
State Constitution, the Cincinnati Charter Amendment permitted homosexuals to
seek relief from the county or state governments.'8° This argument leaves
something to be desired, as it allows each city to decide whether it wishes to
allow discrimination against certain groups of people, but not others.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the United
States for a second time. The Court declined to review the case; however, Justice
Stevens emphasized that the Court in no way intended to imply agreement with
the lower court's decision.'"'
In Andersen v. King County,"2 the plaintiffs disputed Washington's 1998
DOMA under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Washington
Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the Washington Constitution, and the
Equal Rights Amendment.'83 The Washington Supreme Court found each of these
arguments unpersuasive. First, the court explained that the purpose of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is to prevent undue "favoritism," not prohibit
"hostile discrimination" and that the "concern about favoritism arises where a
privilege or immunity is granted to a minority class." '84 Thus, the court was not
persuaded that DOMA violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause because
176. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
177. Equal Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 128 F.3d at 301.
178. Id. at 295.
179. Bodi, supra note 169, at 678.
180. Id. at 698.
181. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943, 943 (1998) ("As I
have pointed out on more than one occasion, the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not a ruling on the
merits. . . .The Court's action today should not be interpreted either as an independent construction of the
charter or as an expression of its views about the underlying issues .... ").
182. 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (5-4 decision) (plurality opinion).
183. Id. at 968.
184. Id. at 972.
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DOMA is a law that favors the majority; it does not grant special treatment to a
minority class.'85
Second, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Washington's marriage
laws violated the State's Equal Rights Amendment. The Equal Rights Amendment to
the Washington Constitution provides that "[e]quality of rights and responsibilities
under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex."'' 16 The court denied
this claim as well, finding that the law "treats both sexes the same; neither a man nor a
woman may marry a person of the same sex." '
In reaching these conclusions, the court provided a narrow interpretation of
Romer, stating that it "rest[ed] on the principle that equal protection is denied
where the law's purpose is discrimination and it has no legitimate government
purpose.' 8 The court further held that Romer did not apply in the marriage
context because it involved a law "motivated solely by animus and.., lacked
any legitimate governmental purpose."'8 9 It distinguished Romer by stating that
"even if animus in part motivates legislative decision making, unconstitutionality
does not follow if the law is otherwise rationally related to legitimate state
interests." '9° Thus, the court declined to follow Romer and held that Washington's
marriage laws are rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of
promoting procreation.' 9' The plurality failed to explain how forbidding certain
people from marrying encouraged others to do so or, in fact, had any effect
whatsoever on how any citizens choose to procreate)92
In Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals took the procreation argument one step further, stating that laws
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples are legitimately "based on a
'responsible procreation' theory that justifies conferring the inducements of
marital recognition and benefits on opposite-sex couples, who can otherwise
produce children by accident, but not on same-sex couples, who cannot."' 193 In
185. Id. at 972-73.
186. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
187. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 969; cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967) ("[M]iscegenation
statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes,
despite their reliance on racial classifications do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race.").
188. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 976.
189. Id. at 981.
190. Id. at 981-82.
191. Id. at982-83.
192. See id. at 1012-13 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) ("The plurality and concurrence condone blatant
discrimination against Washington's gay and lesbian citizens in the name of encouraging procreation, marriage
for individuals in relationships that result in children, and the raising of children in homes headed by opposite-
sex parents, while ignoring the fact that denying same-sex couples the right to marry has no prospect of
furthering any of those interests."); accord Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 (Mass.
2003) ("The department has offered no evidence that forbidding marriage to people of the same sex will
increase the number of couples choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have and raise
children.").
193. Bruning II, 455 F.3d 859, 867 (8th Cir. 2006).
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Bruning, the plaintiffs argued that section 29 was added to the Nebraska
Constitution to prohibit same-sex couples from receiving any state recognition
and "deprive[d] gays and lesbians of 'equal footing in the political arena' because
state and local government officials now lack the power to address issues of
importance to this minority."' 9 The plaintiffs directly attacked section 29 using
the reasoning in Romer; they did not "assert a right to marriage or same-sex
unions."' 95 The Eighth Circuit noted that "Romer contained broad language
condemning the Colorado enactment for making it 'more difficult for one group
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government,'"' 96 but did not
discuss the plaintiffs' argument that section 29 affected them similarly. Instead,
the court said only that "there is no fundamental right to be free of the political
barrier a validly enacted constitutional amendment erects.' 97 The court then went
on to find a rational basis for section 29 without explaining what that rational
basis is.' gs
These cases illustrate that the assertion that the institution of marriage is
under attack by radical judges is unfounded.' 99 Quite to the contrary, the opinions
show that the courts will go a long way to uphold the perceived will of the
people.2°
V. CONCLUSION
All sides can agree that the question of who should be allowed to marry is
currently a heated issue.2°' The California Legislature attempted to pass a law
providing for gender-neutral marriage, but Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed its
202effort. As one group sues the state for equal rights, others hurry to pass a
constitutional amendment to solidify California's existing marriage laws and
ensure that lesbians and gay men are never allowed to enjoy the same right to
marriage that the state grants to heterosexuals. As each of these competing
194. Id. at 865.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 866 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
197. Id. at 868.
198. Id. ("If the many state laws limiting the persons who may marry are rationally related to a
legitimate government interest, so is the reinforcing effect of [section] 29.") (emphasis added). The court noted
that the Legislature has an interest in encouraging heterosexual marriage, but failed to explain either why only
heterosexual couples should marry prior to raising children, or how forbidding same-sex couples from marrying
will encourage opposite-sex couples to do so. Id.
199. See ProtectMarriage.com, Why Its Needed, supra note 151 ("[Jludges have chipped away at
Proposition 22 and ignored the will of the voters.").
200. See Bruning 11, 455 F.3d at 867 ("The Equal Protection Clause 'is not a license for courts to judge
the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the [voters'] choices."' (quoting F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313 (1993))) (alteration in original).
201. Worthen, supra note 7, at 273.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
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groups fights to win the right to define marriage, it is generally recognized that
the Supreme Court of California will eventually have to intervene.2 3
Laws denying the right to marry the person of one's choosing prohibit same-
sex couples from enjoying the California Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection. 2 4 To avoid a judicial determination that the current statutes are
unconstitutional, two conservative groups rush to pass a constitutional
amendment that will define marriage once and for all as a union between one
man and one woman. Additionally, these amendments, if passed, will revoke
domestic partnership rights for registered couples, thereby ensuring that
homosexuals are treated as second-class citizens.0 5
Under the California Constitution, the Supreme Court of California retains
the right to determine the constitutionality of state laws.2°6 If a party brings a suit
challenging an amendment to the State Constitution, the court retains the ability
to review the issue, regardless of any contrary provision written into the law
itself.207 It has been suggested that a court may utilize "an interpretive approach
permitting a later and more specific amendment to be considered in light of
constitutional principles articulated in earlier and more general provisions."20
Under this approach, a state constitutional amendment might not automatically
take precedence over the general equal protection provisions found elsewhere in
the Constitution. A person could challenge the law and the courts could utilize a
balancing test to determine whether the law should be allowed to preempt the
basic guarantee of equal protection.2 9
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court will probably have to decide
whether the fundamental right to marry includes the right of each person to marry
the partner of his or her choosing, even if that partner happens to be of the same
gender." ° Because the judicial branch will almost certainly have the final say,
regardless of intervening constitutional amendments or statutes, any attempt by
the citizens to amend the California State Constitution prior to a judicial
determination of the issue will most likely be moot.
203. Romney & Dolan, supra note 21.
204. See generally Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (declaring that California citizens have a
fundamental right to marry and that California law prohibiting interracial marriage violated equal protection
laws).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85, 89-93.
206. See generally CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.5(a) (stating that no administrative agency may "declare a
statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate
court has made a determination that such a statute is unconstitutional").
207. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
208. Painter, supra note 117, at 157.
209. Id.
210. Romney & Dolan, supra note 21 and text accompanying note 51.

